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Abstract 
The financial market is a subset of assets market. Its efficiency is very important for economic development, 
functioning as a screening institution for investments. The property sector is another group, comprising urban 
land. Urbanization is unavoidable, but very important for developing countries, including Indonesia. The 
process needs huge amount of investment, both private and public. There are many choices, and the financial 
market should be capable to channel the funds to the best overall investments. It should avoid any unproductive 
investment, including speculation. Banking is the most important of the financial institutions in Indonesia, which 
is later complemented by the capital market. As a dominant financial intermediation from the society, the 
commercial banks should channel the funds to the highest productive sector, reflected by its rate of returns, both 
the ROI and the ROE. As a rule of thumb, the two indicators should be higher than the deposit rates or lending 
rates. They should also be higher than the implied return for undeveloped urban land. If not, there is inefficiency. 
The study of the two indicators on a number of firms in the Jakarta Capital Market and the calculation of the 
“implied ROI” for urban land show that it is higher for the second. It leads to the conclusion of the inefficiency of 
funds allocations, and the banking system has failed to screen the best investments, while the capital market does 
not satisfy the EMH. Why? The answer lies in the absence of adequate institution in the assets market, namely the 
lack of investors and society’s participation on financial supervision, wide availability of adequate information 
on comparative investment alternative, freedom from favoritism in the banking system, independent institution 
for the valuation of the assets market.   
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                         Introduction 
                          Even though the 1997/98 crisis has been closely 10 years passing, the analysis of 
the economic situation at that time is still attractive. In analogy with the 1930 depression, the 
publication on the issue, based on new information or new methods of analysis was till coming out. 
It will be useful for understanding the situation, hoping to improve policy formulation in the future. 
Likewise, this retrospect article is hoped to shed more lights on the occurrence of the crisis in 
1997/98.  
One of the prerequisites of the perfect market is the availability of information, which is 
equally accessible for all economic agents. The information should enable to set the price right for 
all assets in a competitive market. There should be an institution care for this task, searching for 
and disseminating the appropriate information. A competitive environment leads to an optimal 
allocation of resources, reflected in the equality of marginal-cost or -benefit for all activities. The 
received ideas assume that capital market is efficient, which means the validity of the EMH, or 
efficient market hypothesis. Unfortunately many studies have shown that the EMH is not wholly 
true1. The well-known herd-behavior in the capital market is a good example, indicating the 
irrationality of the market actors. The bubble phenomenon is found in the capital market, which 
will trigger a crisis when it bursts. Alas, bubble phenomena take place in the assets market in a 
larger context, as in the property market. It entails a cyclical boom and bust in the property market. 
The burst of the bubble is destabilizing. The excessive bubble is unstable, and it should be avoided. 
It needs to be supported by the right institutions to make it healthy. The critical point is the 
assessment of its true value and the right price. Crises hit the poor most severely and could trigger a 
social riots or upheavals. Hence crisis prevention has a pro-poor and stability dimension. So, it 
should be considered as a public good, not only domestically but also internationally. The right 
policy is to avoid excessive volatility and the irrationality of the assets prices.  
 By and large, the economy consists of three markets: products market, labor market, and 
capital market. At the margin, benefits should be equal to costs, and marginal costs between 
products within a market or between industries must be equal, and between the product and the 
capital. Financial market, as a subset of asset market in a general sense, serves all markets, because 
money or financial asset is fungible. Due to its fungible use, any flaw in the financial market leads 
to vaster distortion in the economy. As such, the financial market efficiency is crucial to the 
economic efficiency, because its distortions extend to subsequent activities in many sectors. 
Commercial bank is decisive for the developing countries. Hence the deposit rate in the banks is a 
reference point for the rate of return in the corporate sectors’ investment. Such relation is critically 
important for the listed firms in the capital market, like in the JSX. Even though it does not imply 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for the performance of the economy due to the importance 
of the real sector, the efficiency of the financial and then the whole assets market is vital.  
 This article is an essay on the situation of assets market before the 1997 crisis, namely the 
property market and financial market. As such, the following discussion will be as follows: First, 
the introduction, giving the raisons d’etre of the article. Secondly, it will be followed by brief 
explanation of the assets market, namely the property and financial market. The property market 
will be dominated by the land price issues. Thirdly, the issue on the deregulation and liberalization 
of the economy will be treated, with a special note on the financial issue. Fourthly, the issue of 
urbanization and demographic development will be discussed. Urbanization process could trigger 
a hidden transfer of wealth within the society, from the general public to the land owner or de-
velopers. Following the fourth topic the process of getting rich by impoverishing other members of 
the society will be treated in the fifth part. The related issues on economic rents will be discussed 
here. The sixth part discusses the Indonesian Financial Market before 1997. The anomaly on the 
                                                           
1  A lot of works have been dedicated to this topics, see for example Shiller (1991) 
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Indonesian capital market will be treated here, compared to the banking deposit rate and also the 
urban land prices development in several locations in Jakarta. Based on the obtained insights in the 
previous discussions, the seventh part treated the issue on the necessity of creating an appropriate 
institution to render the assets market healthy. There is a need for a private ordering, as was 
promulgated by the New Institution Economy, making the society care for resolving their disputes 
on land value and prices, especially in urban areas. Then part eight concludes, stressing the formation 
of a healthy economy, which is free from economic rents. Urban land economic rents is not just 
mostly damaging the poor people.  
 
Dual Components 
of the Assets Market 
 As it is familiar to all of us, the financial system consists of three institutions, namely: the 
commercial banks, capital markets, and the insurance system. As it was said, the dominant 
financial institution in Indonesia is the commercial banks, much more than the capital market. 
Other non-banking financial institutions are still weak or in its incipient stage. The bonds market is 
also still weak, especially the government bonds (SUN) or the SBI (bank recapitalization bonds 
from Bank Indonesia). The bond market is important in the financial system, so it needs to be 
supported and developed properly. According to one of the IFC publication, an appropriate 
development of the bond market should be in place before the development of the capital market. It 
is the reverse which happened here. 
Due to its development process, the pace of urbanization is high in Indonesia. One of the problems 
lies in the lacking of well-equipped land for all building purposes. Suitable land for housing 
buildings of all kinds requires infrastructures, necessitating huge amount of investments. While the 
financial capacity of the government is limited, the cities develop insufficiently equipped, leading 
to scarcity on suitable land for construction. It leads to urban land price hikes. Thirty years of 
continuous development with minor disturbances entails a feeling of euphoria, both for the 
government and the population in general. The price of urban land rises continually to irrational 
level without any questions. >From the other side, the urban development in Indonesia is more 
horizontally directed, because of the still unpopular high-rise housing for the population. Hence 
the high intensity of urban land for each housing unit, leads to scarcer situation of the urban land 
and higher prices.  
 For sustainable economic development, the economy should have a built-in system to direct 
the funds to the most productive investments, which are assumed, conducted by the market. But 
the markets should have been well equipped to do the job, and the experience in the assets market 
fail to conform to the conditions. In order to reach the result, there must be institution to do the job. 
The growth of monetary value of assets should be due to the real contribution of production, both 
now and/or in the future. The value of an asset should be equal to the present value of its future 
stream of incomes. This is important for a developing country like Indonesia with an important 
structural change in the economy, leading to significant change in the relative prices of products 
and assets.  
The present value of incomes will be determined by the pattern of income and interest rates. 
Hence, by comparing the year-by-year return on investment to the deposit or lending rates, one will 
arrive at the conclusion, whether an investment is worth for the society or not. It is equally valid 
both for the price of a parcel of land or the stock price. They have to be equal to the present value of 
today’s and future or implied incomes from the assets.  
 The markets, including the capital market cannot go alone. Other institutions should 
accompany it, namely a built-in-system for information provision. Inherently the asset market is 
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saddled with unsymmetrical or incomplete information, hence the demand for transparency. 
Following Khan et al [1999], the understanding of “institutions” comprises formal rules, informal 
constraints, and their enforcement characteristics. The enforcement of transparency requirement is 
a kind of institution. Any increase in the value of the assets should be justifiable, due to the rise in 
the implied or the potential incomes of the assets. The generally available information and the 
released one have to enable it. Without such a justification, the increase in the assets price could be 
economically false. Any increase in the asset prices, which are only the result of rising demand, 
without any prospect for immediate production contribution is unjustifiable. Other pertinent 
institution is the good practices on assets value assessment, and a system of voluntary enforcement 
of the right assets values by disseminating them to the public. It is not intended to replace the 
market, but a way to fill in the gap on the situation of unsymmetrical and incomplete information. 
In the product market, the flourishing advertorial activities show how lack the information is. So 
the point is the wide availability of the required information and the dissemination of the value 
assessment methods, enabling the public to determine or assess the asset price for themselves. It 
should be regarded as a public service provision.  
 
Deregulation and Liberalization 
of the Economy 
  The first deregulation in financial sector in Indonesia was introduced in 1983, when the 
banks were let free to determine their deposit interest rates, not subject to the Central Bank ceiling, 
as the Regulation Q in the US (Kidwell, et al, 2000, p. 48). Further, the commercial banks were 
also free to allocate the credits according to the market mechanism. In the middle of 80s, fiscal 
reform was enacted, simplifying the tax brackets and the assessment procedures of taxable 
incomes, and then the introduction of the value added tax (VAT). The new step of the government 
policy was due to the declining incomes of the government from petrol since 1983 and other 
exported products. Sharp decline in the oil price in 1986, urged the government to shift to a new 
strategy: from previously government dominated economy to a private dominated system. There 
was a lot of liberalization, both in the financial sector and the real sector, namely on trade and 
industry. In 1987, the capital market was also liberalized. Fortunately, these resulted in a 
substantial revival of the whole economy, where the non-oil products and gas export surged. In 
order to abolish the bureaucratic handicaps for export, the custom operation was contracted to SGS 
(Société Générale de Surveillance), a Switzerland based private firm. In 1988, the government 
announced a vast deregulation package, a sweeping financial market reforms, especially for the 
banks. The package was familiarly dubbed as PAKTO 88. After the package, the establishments of 
new banks or its branches within the country were liberalized. The reserve ratio was substantially 
reduced, from the previous level of 15 percent to only around 2 percent. 
 The financial deregulation of 1988 proved to be decisive steps to jump-start the sector. It has 
been positive for some sectors of the economy, previously having bottlenecks in its development 
due to lacking in financial sources. But alas, there were several activities, where the demands were 
artificially engineered. The financial deregulation has made it possible for the banks to extend 
credit without sufficient reserves according to prudential attitude. The banking sectors were 
aggressive in supplying credit to the households. The global trend was in favor of the process, 
triggering a feeling of euphoria, neglecting the previous prudential or conservative well-accepted 
practices in the businesses and the economy as a whole. There was a wide laxity, both in the 
government circle and in the private sector. The meaning of deregulation has been misinterpreted, 
as if it is a system without regulation. The appropriate regulation in the financial markets, which is 
saddled with externalities, was vastly neglected. Any mention on regulation was considered as 
passé, and the deregulation cum de-bureaucratization was supposed all the necessary and sufficient 
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condition to unleash the potential of the economy. The euphoria attitudes make the people blind on 
the difference between the rise in the financial value and the value of goods and services. Any rise 
in the monetary value was considered as a positive.  
 One of the most spectacular negative impacts of the bank deregulation of 1988 was the entry 
of the actors in the sector, having no sufficient professional expertise, both the owners and the 
managers. The fit and proper test was totally absent. Many of the owners had the background of 
traders or industrialists. Many new banks and branches were established, and the human resources 
for that were scarce, leading to staff hijacking or employing inappropriate personnel to occupy all 
the available posts. The attitudes of the personnel did not stand up to what is required by the 
professions, especially in assessing the risks of the credits, but also in managing liability side. High 
potential return was automatically considered as profitable, without taking into account the 
attending risks. The thesis of the portfolio theory states that the higher the returns, the higher the 
risk of any investment. This was lacking in the spirit of those involved in the financial sectors of 
that time, an unprecedented vast deregulation.  
 The waves of deregulation are really meant to unleash the efficiency of the economy. 
Efficiency entails decline in prices, the rise in goods quality with the same price or both. In the 
banking sector, the price is equivalent to the interest rates. But what happened was the reverse: the 
level of interest rates was generally rising after the deregulation. Credit became abundant, but 
interest rates rose. There must be an error some-where in the economy. The economic actors were 
keen to find the potentially high return projects. Trading and property sectors were the darling of 
the market, which potentially rendering high returns. Some of the credits intended for industrial 
sectors were redirected to the real estate businesses in general or to the commercial buildings. 
Hence the oversupply of the property sectors, which later proven contributing substantial amount 
to non-performing loans. Vast financial deregulation leading to easy money was the culprit.  
 After the Bank Deregulation of 88, the capital market of Jakarta developed very well. Many 
companies were listed, resulting in the disintermediation process for the banking system. The best 
corporations were rushing into the capital market. The whole process has been squeezing the bank 
from two sides: from the asset side and from liability side. The ‘highest quality’ corporate 
customers quitted the banks, which were used to be their fund provider, resulting in a loss of the 
best borrowers, drying up the cash flows for the banks2. The attractiveness of the capital market 
enticed a group of vital depositors to withdraw their funds from the banks and put them in other 
investment vehicle. In order to maintain the old depositors and to attract the new ones, the banks 
raised the deposit rates from the previous normal rate. The banks compete to attract the depositors, 
either by raising deposit rates and/or by offering prizes through lot drawing. It was felt necessary at 
a time when many best corporate customers bypass them by direct transaction with the final 
investors. The disintermediation process is well known and well recorded in the developed country, 
but was alien at that time to Indonesia. In the United States, the Fortune 1000 corporations utilized 
the money market rather than the commercial banks for their short-term borrowing because 
commercial paper rates were considerably lower [Gart, 1994, p. 3]. It became popular in Indonesia 
after the Bank Deregulation of 88.  
Unfortunately the financial system fails to reveal the information on the economic realities in 
the grassroots, which confronts a series of challenges to the production system to succeed. There is 
no a one-to-one mapping between the decisive factors in the real economy to the information 
delivered by the financial reports. The vital information in the capital market inside the buildings is 
very different to the real situation in the field. There is huge gap between the realities with what is 
represented by the information. And it seems that without prior right institution in place to care for 
                                                           
2 The ‘highest quality’ should put in quotation marks due to the later facts, where most of those listed firms were in fact not as good as they 
were assumed (See later section on capital market performance) 
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the right information, the deregulation pushed the negative trend to the worse situation. The mass 
media is still lacking in capabilities to digest and report the situation. Information pertaining to the 
capital and assets market in general should be considered as public goods, because it will touch the 
public, with important impacts for the economy. 
  
Urbanization and  
Demographic Development 
 The rate of population growth in Indonesia is still high compared to the industrialized 
countries, notwithstanding the success of the birth control program in the country. It has been 
successful in lowering the birth rate from more than 2 percent at the beginning of Suharto era to 
much less than 2 percent later. As a matter of fact, the rising role of the industries and services in 
the economy is accompanied by a rapid urbanization, much higher than the population growth. In 
the 80s, urban population growth is in the order of 5 percent. The rapid urbanization entails 
substantial rise of the demand for housing. In addition to that, there is a rising demand for land for 
industry and office building or other activities. All these lead to an urban land scarcity, provoking 
substantial rise on the urban land price. This is the demand side. Land for construction needs 
appropriate provision on infrastructures, namely road network, drainage system and ditches, and 
other public utilities like water pipe-lines, electricity, telephone lines, and so on. The required 
funds for public goods and public utilities provision is huge, which is much higher compared to the 
financial capacity of the country. As a result, the pace of public goods and public utilities provision 
falls short of demand. This is the supply side of the problem. This is another additional factor in 
raising the urban land price, on top of the rising demand due to rising population and activities. 
Rising demand for cum insufficiency of supply on the suitable urban land for construction leads to 
significant urban land price hike.  
 The rising price of urban land entails a rise in the prices of housing. But what is seen as more 
disturbing, both socially and economically, it entails a rising proportion of urban land cost in the 
price of houses. The pace of urban land price hike is faster than the rate of economic growth and/or 
inflation. The rising price of houses makes a barrier to entry for many households to the good 
housing. In the appendix, table AP4 presents a group of housing styles, showing the ratio of land 
price to the price of the house. The data is taken from a flier of a real estate firm. The ratio of land to 
house price in the table ranges from 54,3 percent to 69,1 percent. The ratio is very high compared 
to what is found in French and the U.S., which lies at around 20 percent. The ever rising price of 
houses, has a direct impact for the households, extracting more and more income for shelter. But 
the pace of wage rise falls short of the house price growth. The developers, seeking for cheaper 
land, build housing complexes in the city outskirts, becoming farther and farther from the city 
center or other activity center in the city. The population of the city in Indonesia is not used to live 
in the apartments of the multistory buildings. The city develops more in the horizontal dimension, 
instead of vertically, which has been the norm in the developed countries, namely in Europe and 
Japan. The still dominant preference of the population to live in individual house raises the demand 
for urban land, higher than if it were accepted to live in condominium or apartment building. This 
is also in conjunction to the culture of individual owner-occupier type of dwelling, so that the 
housing in the form of apartments is not popular. It needs more efforts to socialize the apartment 
housing styles.  
 By observing the public goods and public utilities in the urban area, one arrives at the 
conclusion that they are from the network type. Road network plays an important role as the 
reference framework of the city. Any network systems is endowed with the natural monopoly 
characteristic, subjects to economies of scale. Urban area is characterized by high density of public 
goods and utilities. All these networks constitute the underlying structure of the city, producing 
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substantial externalities in the city. The whole positive external effects consist of several contribu-
tions from many urban phenomena, network-system of public goods, embedded in the public 
goods characteristic, the economies of agglomeration. It is a mutually reinforcing process of the 
externality economy in the city.  
 In the macroeconomic account, household expenditures for buying houses or for its 
construction are classified as investment. House price inflation, due to the rising urban land prices, 
will drive the required investment up. The rise in the urban land price will also drive up the land 
price component for commercial building and trading firms. The same thing happens on the land 
for industries in the industrial estate complexes, raising the new investments for industries. In the 
aggregate, it is counterproductive to the whole economy, because it drives up the ICOR, leading to 
a reduction of the economic growth from a certain amount of investment funds. There are instances 
where the housing sector could be used as a stimulus for moving the economy out of depression, 
where capacity is underutilized and unemployment is rampant. But it is false to generalize it to all 
cases as in the following citation: <What is disputed is the view that the home ownership market 
now holds the key to economic recovery, and that all that is required to jump start the economy is a 
new housing demand and sales.3> If the economy has been at near or full employment stage, 
provoking a boom in the housing market could raise the land price, including the land for 
industries. It leads to the rise in the required initial investment for industries. Even though 
investments comprise expenditures for housing construction, the policy makers should pay 
attention to the whole capacity utilization of the economy.  
 
Abolishing Hidden Transfer 
 It is clear that the unjustified increase of the urban land price has a negative impact to the 
economy as a whole. From the other side, it has an unfairness dimension: urban land price is highly 
influenced by the availability of public infrastructures and public utilities, external economy 
effects. The financial sources for the public goods are usually from taxes. From the other side, the 
unusually high price of urban land has its origin in the scarcity, not due to any growth in individual 
productivity. Hence the capital gain in the urban land has its origin in the scarcity factor cum the 
external economy impacts of the public goods or infrastructures. There is an unfair hidden transfer 
from the general public taxpayers to the landowners or the land speculators or the developers. The 
income of beneficiary from the “capital gains” in urban land is not earned in the sense that it is not 
the result of productive works. It is pure economic rent, is an unjust hidden transfer. Its negative 
impact in the form of rising ICOR is further complicated by unjust distribution of incomes. And on 
top of that, it will put the lower class of urban population in a more and more difficult situation to 
live in a decent dwelling. It has a deteriorating impact for the urban society, which in turn may trig-
ger a social upheaval, leading to riots. In order to have a just & healthy economy there should be a 
right institution in place, endowed with the capacity and methods to do an appropriate assessment 
of true value and prices of the assets. The taxation system should be charged to extract most of the 
pure rents, used for financing the infrastructures and public goods.  
The economy in question should be without unfair/hidden transfer of income, without 
appreciable rents4, impoverishing one segment of the population. It occurs by legally forcing them 
to pay taxes used for constructing the public infrastructures. Houses should be primarily for shelter, 
not as a means of speculation. Getting rich from windfall gain in urban land due to scarcity is 
destructive because it is not a result of an act of production. It could provoke a wider speculation in 
urban land. It is a kind of the casino capitalism5, which should be avoided, both for the reasons of 
                                                           
3  Chis Hamnett: “Restructuring Housing Finance and the Housing Market”, in Corbridge, S. et.al [1994] 
4  Rents become the material of discussion on incentive theory, see Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. [1993]  
5  Susan Strange: “From Bretton Woods to the Casino Economy”, in Corbridge, S., Ron Martin, and Nigel Thrift (editors) [1994], pp. 49-62.  
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justice and economic efficiency. Any income has to be the compensation of work, either through 
wages by working for others or by enterprising. The thesis of J.B. Say proclaims that the capacity 
of someone to buy any goods should be the reflection of his capacity to produce other goods.  
It is opportune to see the economy as a pool of product values: if someone takes a product 
and put the same value of product to it in exchange, the economy is in balance. But if a person 
takes a product without exchanging the same value of goods, the economy will be in imbalance. In 
the case of an imbalance, it results in the higher value of demand than the value of supply. It is 
contrary to prerequisites of JB.Say, provoking inflation. The act of taking product from the pool is 
the result of using the incomes from windfall gains to buy goods. Due to pure rents within the 
inflated price of land, the aggregate impacts in the economy will end up with what is characterized 
by Greenspan as follows. It is said: <… if you measure America’s GDP by adding up output across 
the economy you get smaller figures than if you measure it by adding up incomes (in principle, of 
course, the two should tally) 6>. But the incomes are the unearned incomes, meaning the incomes 
without productive works. The so-called wealth effect is now very popular in the United States of 
America, especially related to capital market. Alas, the latest report from the US showed a growing 
social inequality, even though it is not only to be ascribed to the wealth-effects phenomena. In the 
case of Indonesia, especially in the Jakarta area, the accompanying deterioration of distribution of 
income (inequality) is easily seen in the growing slump area, some of them are the previously 
expropriated landowners. The sense of unfairness in the society materialized in the recent social 
upheaval. The policy makers should task itself to avoid such an adverse situation, which should be 
the result of good economic and social policy, in the framework of the appropriate institutions. 
Getting the institutions right is the order of the day, where the good governance ought to be 
resulting from such framework.  
 
Getting Rich By Impoverishing Others. Urban Case  
 Indonesia is still at its infancy stage in the process of industrialization. It is clear that it is 
accompanied by or provoking rapid urbanization. The pace of urbanization is much higher 
compared to what hitherto happened in the present developed countries. Due to the rapidity of 
urbanization, a much higher amount of funds for infrastructure provisions is needed, while the 
financial capacity is limited. From the other side, it is found that the capital gain for the beneficiary 
is substantially high. The following Table 1 below shows the prices of land in an area with low 
level of infrastructure availability compared to a high level one. This will be transformed into 
capital gains in Table 2 for the beneficiaries, entailed by an upgrading of the infrastructure from 
low to higher level.  
 
Rent Nationalization Rather than 
Land Nationalization 
Table 2 shows the magnitude of capital gain per km of road. At the time of the report, the 
construction cost per km of road (without the price of land) lied between 1000 to 2000 million 
rupiah. In the second circle from the CBD, by assuming the ZOI (zone of influence) of the road to 
be 100 M for each side of the road, the capital gain was at the order of 6-12 times the road cost. The 
capital gain is really huge, but unfortunately it is economically flawed because it does not add the 
same value of goods to the national pool of goods. It increases the income of the beneficiaries, 
enjoying the wealth effects, raising their purchasing power. The latest study confirmed that a rise in 
the wealth causes rise in demand.  
                                                           
6  The Economist, June 17th 2000, under the “Economic Focus”, p. 94 
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Due to a (temporarily) constant supply of the goods and services, two things could 
happen: imports will surge, or prices will go up or inflation will happen, or the two could 
simultaneously happen. The rise in imports will deteriorate the current account, and the rise in 
inflation will disturb the economic stability and the exchange rates, which has negative impacts 
for international trade. In short, there will be economic disturbances to the economy due to 
windfall gains. There will be a deterioration of the distribution of income and wealth, too. 
 
Table 1 
Price of urban land per M2 
with different infrastructure availability, Jakarta 
Distance from 
CBD in km 




between high-low High Low 





5.1 – 10.0 184,898.00 123,471.00 49.8 
10.1 – 15.0 87,213.00 47,691.00 82.9 
> 15.0 43,035.00 22,913.00 87.9 
Overall 169,275.00 113,721.00 48,9 
Source: Dowel et. al  
 
Table 2 
Calculated Capital Gain Per Kilometer of Road After Upgrading 
Distance from 
CBD 
Z.O.I., 200M to 
the right and left 
of the road (Rp. 
million) 
Z.O.I., 100M to 
the right and left 
of the road (Rp. 
million) 
Comment 
0.0-5.0      Km 39,620.00 19,810.00 The construction 
cost of urban-road 
was approximately 
between 1000-2000 
million rupiah.  
5.1-10.0    Km 24,570.80 12,280.90 
10.1-15.0  Km 15,808.80 7,904.40 
   > 15.0    Km 8,449.20 4,224.60 
Overall  22,221.60 11,110.80 
Z.O.I. = Zone of Influence of the road.  
Source: Calculated, based onTtable 1 
 
The occurrence of this phenomenon does raise concern both on economic or social reasons, 
because it is not the result of productive works. Work has been one of the social institutions, for 
creating wealth. There will be social discord if anyone could amass wealth without supported by 
commensurate works. By considering the potential perverse social effects, it is a sound reason to 
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put appropriate instruments in place to avoid the pure rents to occur. This is the idea of the 
abolition of pure rents7.  
The capital gain is substantially higher compared to the construction cost of the road. At the 
time of the study, the land tax was still very low. For the reasons of justice, there should be a 
mechanism to charge the cost of the road construction to the beneficiary, not to be charged to the 
taxpayers. Bahl et al.8 express concern on the way to capture the windfall gains: <The central 
question we raise is how better to finance the public services in large, growing cities and in particular 
how to capture the benefits of urbanization in order to increase the supply of services …>. But here 
the ultimate goal is for the purpose of making the economy healthy. To reach the objective, the 
capital gain of the urban land should be nationalized9, meaning taxed away, so that the any 
incomes should have products as counterpart in the economy. The tax rate should be in a 
progressive system. If not, wide expectation on windfall gain will provoke wide speculation on 
urban land. The nationalization of the urban land rents is an institution for keeping firstly the urban 
land market healthy, then the economy as a whole, where every income should be the result of 
productive activities. A well accepted solid methodology for assessing the real value of urban land, 
both seen from an individual owner perspective and also from the whole city perspective should be 
implanted to the good practices business conduct, hence as another institution. The presence of 
externality phenomena in the urbanized area is the source of the difference between the two values. 
The availability of value assessment methodology for urban land should be the basis of the 
imposition of capital gains taxes for urban land. 
Due to the present low level of urbanization in Indonesia, the process will continue with a 
substantial rate of growth. Urban spatial development, both in the form of urban extension or new 
urban formation, will entail a large new urban area built-up with its inherent economic rents 
problems. Continuing urbanization and the population growth will work in tandem to increase the 
degree of scarcity of urban land for housing and other activities, leading to price hike as previously 
mentioned. It is complicated by the limited financial capacity of the government for the provision 
of urban infrastructure. The whole situation does not sit in harmony with the windfall gains to 
beneficiaries, landowners or speculators of developers, both from the justice and economic effi-




                                                           
7 Incentive theory as described by Laffont, J.-J, and Jean Tirole [1993], has a final objective for abolishing rents. The examples from the MIT 
Energy Laboratory [1984] and FERC [1989] lead to the argument, that the acceptable rates of return is in the range of 13% < r < 15%. If 
more, it contains rents. See p. 16.  
8 Bahl, Roy W., Johannes F. Lir [1992], p. 1 
9 The source of idea on the urban land rents nationalization is the idea of Leon Walras on nationalization of land, due to the potential unlimited price 
hike. Walras propose the nationalization of land in order to preserve the market system in the economy as a whole. Here, the author propose the 
above substitute.  
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The timely provision of such institution will lead to better fund allocation, between real 
production activities and speculation on land or in other general assets. Land is not a commodity 
because it is not produced. Land is inseparable from the house or group of houses or other build-
ings. Due to those reasons the price of land in the whole house price and other buildings should get 
only a just proportion. Urban land or land speculation in general, based on the rising scarcity and 
its manipulation to raise its price unjustifiably high should be avoided. As it was previously said, 
the main purpose of house ownership should be for shelter, not for speculation. It could be deterred 
by imposing progressive taxes on the second, third and further houses. There should be an 
endogenous incentive system in the economy to raise the preference of the earned incomes from 
productive work or activities rather than from pure economic rents.  
 In practice, there is a policy-entailed distortion in the urban or general land market in 
Indonesia. The land used for public infrastructures is priced far below the market, with an 
argument that the infrastructures are for public uses. The owners of the land feel an unjust 
treatment. There is hidden dissatisfaction among those whose lands were expropriated for roads, 
schools, buildings and property for defense purposes, and so on, because they did not get the just 
compensation according to prevailing land price formation. But economic theory tells us that the 
price of any goods should be the same, no matter for what purpose. The aggregate benefits of using 
a public infrastructure should be more than an individual benefit, under the condition that the 
assessment is correctly conducted. If it is not, then the public good concerned is not worth to be 
constructed. It is necessary to stress here, that the government should be the first to apply the eco-
nomic efficiency principle, due to its position as a superstructure institution. The equality of land 
price for public and private use at the adjacent sites should be equal. In a country like Indonesia, the 
practices in the state level will be considered as a good example to follow. So the government has 
to task itself to set the prices of all resources right, especially on resources used for public goods, 
namely land in the urban areas.  
 The negative social side of the process of enrichment without cause is the rising price of 
houses in the urban area, where the price of land is dominant, reaching 70 percent of the price of 
the house. More and more households become marginalized, living in the houses without sufficient 
sanitation. At the time, the government introduced house plans, with the floor area of 36 square 
meter, and then reduced to 21 M2, irrespective of the family size. Some of these households were 
from the expropriated land for infrastructure, or generally from incoming migration from the rural 
areas. It is a contrast situation: the purpose of all developments is proclaimed for the general wel-
fare. But in fact, some of the population become poorer while others are better off, enjoying a 
better living but without productive activities counterpart. The process of such impoverishing 
development should be avoided, where the urbanized area lies at the forefront. It happened in the 
mid of rampant speculation on urban land, raising its price to the advantage of a few. Here the 
usual perception that speculation will equalize the price in several markets could not be valid. One 
of the disturbing facts is that, that some speculators are not the owners of the land, leaving some 
owners on the losers’ side. The data in table 3 below shows the development of urban land price in 
several locations in Jakarta. The table shows absolute land price development in million rupiah per 
square meter, and followed by the yearly percentage price growth, and then the whole period 
growth rates (geometrical growth rates).  
 In the same table, it is also presented the year-by-year inflation and the period average 
inflation rate, followed by yearly deposit rates, completed by the period deposit average rates. It is 
easily seen that the urban land price growth rates in the six locations are higher than either the 
inflation or the deposit rates. What does it mean? The benefit of investing in land is much more 
beneficial than placing the money in the banks. In real terms the monetary values of the urban land 
in the six locations grow with very high rates, having a net impact of increasing the wealth asset in 
monetary terms. From this point of view, investment in the urban land guarantees a high return, 
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compared to other acts of investing in industrial activities, as it will be clear in the following 
discussions. But unfortunately, risk consideration is absent, leading to incomplete contract 
situation in the incentive theory. The actors are only thinking on profits without considering any 
potential bust.  
 
Rent-free Economy as a condition 
for Healthy Economy 
 In the one of the footnotes of this article on the issue of pure economic rent, which is referred 
to the books of Messrs. Laffont and Tirole, the supposed to be acceptable rates of return in the New 
York Telephone Co. was between 13-15 percent. The cited corporation is a productive activity, 
rendering services to people. The rates of return in the telephone company is surely the result of 
earning income by putting services to the national pool of goods, an exchange with equal footing. 
This is a sound prerequisite of a healthy economy, an exchange of production in goods and/or 
services. Monetary income should only be a reflection of the real exchange of produced goods 
and/or services in the economy. The exchange process should not bring about an excessive rate of 
return, even though it happens in the real production of goods and services. Any excess in rate of 
return contains a pure economic rent component. This is one of the main messages of the modern 
incentive theory: pure rent abolition. In order to be able to maintain or to construct a healthy 
economy, it is worth to firstly well identify the potential sources of pure economic rents. Both from 
the long time experiences of the developed countries and the still short experiences of the 
developing countries, the conclusion is clear, that the urban land is potentially containing pure eco-
nomic rents. Hence, the attention of the development economic should be also directed to this field. 
Urbanization with its urban land price problems alongside with its potential impoverishing impacts 
should be avoided or minimized to the extent possible.  
 The following table, table 3, shows the urban land price development and the yearly growth 
rates in six (6) locations of Jakarta.  By reiterating the previous arguments, the rise in the urban 
land price in the six locations is surely contaminated by the pure economic rents case. By 
comparing the land price development to the deposit rates, it is easily seen that placing money in 
urban lands is more profitable compared to bank deposits, or even by investing the equity market. 




 Urban Land Price Development in Several Locations of Jakarta,  
Inflation, & Deposit Rates Land Price in Rp. Million/M2 
Location Year 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 96/83 
Rasuna Sd   0.4 0.4 0.45 0.45 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.8 3.2 4 4 4.6 5 5.6 14 
Gtt Subroto 0.6 0.6 0.65 0.75 0.9 1.25 2 3.4 3.65 3.8 4.6 5 6.5 8.2 13.67 
Sudirman 0.7 0.85 0.95 1 1.25 1.8 3 5.5 6.5 6.5 7 7.5 8.5 10 14.3 
Pdk Indah 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.275 0.35 0.45 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.75 2.1 2.5 15.6 
Kbn Jeruk 0.1 0.125 0.15 0.175 0.25 0.425 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.7 0.8 1 1.1 1.2 12 
Bintaro 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.125 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.25 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.55 0.7 0.75 12.5 
Yearly land price growth, % 
 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Avrg.* 
Rasuna Sd    0 12.5 0 33.3 16.67 71.4 133 14.3 25 0 15 8.7 12 22.5 
Gtt Subroto  0 8.33 15.38 20 38.89 60 70 7.35 4.11 21.1 8.7 30 26.2 22.3 
Sudirman  21.43 11.8 5.263 25 44 66.7 83.3 18.2 0 7.69 7.14 13.3 17.6 22.7 
Pdk Indah  12.5 11.1 37.5 27.3 28.57 55.6 28.6 22.2 13.6 12 25 20 19 23.6 
Kbn Jeruk  25 20 16.67 42.9 70 17.6 10 9.09 16.7 14.3 25 10 9.09 21.1 
Bintaro  33.33 37.5 13.64 12 14.29 12.5 38.9 40 14.3 12.5 22.2 27.3 7.14 21.4 
* Geometrical average growth rates between 1983 until 1996. 
Inflation, %  10.4 4.8 5.7 9.3 8.1 6.4 7.8 9.4 7.6 9.6 8.5 9.4 8 7.9 
Deposit Rt. 6 16 18 15.4 16.8 17.7 18.6 17.3 23.3 19.6 14.6 12.5 16.7 17.3 15.8 
Inflation average rate: 1983-96 = 7.9 %                                       Deposit average rate: 1983-96 = 15.8 % 
Source: Summarized and calculated  from several tables, Simarmata 
 
The rise in an asset price due to the increase in its future productive capacity is surely justifiable. 
The construction of an infrastructure in a city will increase the production capacity of the city 
system and the enjoyment of cheaper services. These are real benefits, partly generated by the 
infrastructure provision, financed by taxes. The whole benefits of city development, resides in the 
framework of positive sum games should be for the whole urban community, not to limited number 
of landowners. The aggregation process of people is the precursor of the city benefits, which go 
hand in hand with the natural endowment of the area. The combination of the two, complemented 
by much human enabling quality to take advantage from the advancement of science and tech-
nology will play a great role in the productive capacity formation of the city. If within and due to 
the process any factor of production or any asset experiences a price hike, substantial part of the 
monetary benefits due to the rise should go to the society. If not, the asset holders have obtained 
undue income. The example of Laffont and Tirole in the telephone service leads to a lesson, that 
the profits of the developers in the property sectors should be comparable to other production 
activities. The beneficial site of the urban land for property is due to the presence of many 
infrastructure networks, having a natural monopoly characteristic, in analogy with the telephone 
network. The example in Indonesia violates that similarity, as the level of profit for developers is 
much higher than in other industries.  
  Surprisingly, urban house market shows inconsistency with the house rental market. From 
several case studies in Jakarta, it was found that the present value of the house rentals for the 
technical life of the structure was much lower than the cost of the house, namely the cost of land 
plus the construction cost of the building. Even worse, the present value was less than the price of 
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the parcel of land for the house. The calculations were conducted for several levels of interest rates: 
the then prevailing rates, 15 percent, and 10 percent. Besides that, the house rental has in addition 
been assumed to grow 10 percent per year. Even by using 10 percent interest rates plus an yearly 
rental growth of 10 percent, the present value of the house rental was still less than the land cost of 
the house. It should be stressed here that the calculation has been neglecting the risk factor. If the 
risk factor has been taken into account, it should raise the interest rate several percent higher than 
the going or market interest rates. This is the controversial fact, even without taking the risk factor, 
the house renting does not render a suitable rate of return. Such situation should incite the capital 
owners to shift their investment to other activities. But what happens is the contrary. The fact 
seems to confirm the hypothesis that the house-owners do not expect yearly income from their 
investment but waiting only for capital gains in the future10? There is no systematic link between 
the rental price of the house with the house market price. The expected relation should be analog to 
the relation between the bond price with its coupon rate. Otherwise stated, the rental price divided 
by the house price should be equal to the level of interest rates. The data on rental and the price of 
the house seem to contradict the assumption of EMH since there is no relation between housing 
rental prices with the house price. Are they aware of the speculative nature of their ‘investment’? It 
is not a genuine investment, and so, it seems necessary to “go back to basic” on the meaning of 
investment. The recent very high prices of houses in the industrialized countries11 shed lights on 
the impropriety of those assets to the normal practice of investment outside the housing markets. 
 
Indonesian Financial Market Performance 
 It was mentioned above that the banking deregulation is enacted within the framework of the 
1988 financial deregulation. Since 1989, after the banking deregulation, the capital market was on 
the rise, until before the 1997 crisis. A lot of comments have been directed to the capital market 
performance, where some were concerned with the casino-like situation of the capital market. 
Some are concerned with the fact that the rise in the stock price was not justified by the rise in the 
corporate profits12, or worse the corporation incurs a loss. How could such a situation come about 
if the so-called EMH does hold? This is one of the signs of the capital market inefficiency, lack of 
corporate governance.  
 As it was written above, the pillars of the financial system are the banking system, the capital 
market, and the insurance and pension funds. The highest nominal outstanding credit in the 
banking system in June 1998 was 626.5 trillion rupiah, and at the end of 1999 it was only 225 
trillion rupiah. There was a substantial decline in the nominal outstanding credit. This is mostly due 
to the very bad situation of the banking system, saddled with a huge amount of non-performing 
loans, NPL and the real sectors are mostly stuck in the red. From the other side, the index of the 
JSX is hovering around 500, rebounding from its lowest level at around 250, rising to the level of 
approaching 600, and then falls to the level of 500. Market capitalization of JSX at the end of 1998 
is 175.7 trillion rupiah, or 22.1 billion US$ equivalent. There are two capital market centers, 
namely in Jakarta and Surabaya. Unfortunately, the bond market is still underdeveloped. And the 
mortgage market is almost negligible. This is regrettable, because the bond markets as important 
source of long-term debt is missing. The lack of mortgage market is also regrettable due to its 
contribution to the right assessment of the property price is positive. The insurance and pension 
plan system is still at its beginning stage. Life insurance system consists of life insurance 
companies, non-life insurance & reinsurance companies, social insurance, and civil servant & 
                                                           
10 Bahl et Flir states <… to the extent that the after-tax rate of return on investment in housing is reduced … capital owners may reduce 
maintenance of and new investment in housing and shift their resources to other uses, …>. This is the logic of the received ideas on 
investment, which is violated in property in Indonesia.  
11 See the BIS report on these issues: CGFS No. 26, p. 8 
12 The writer expressed the critic on this in one of its “in-house” seminar on rents (someday in 1994/95).  
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army insurance. At the end of 1997, total asset of life insurance is 12.345 trillion rupiah, non-life 
insurance has a total asset of 8.187 trillion rupiah, social insurance is of 6.454 trillion rupiah, and 
the insurance of civil servant & the army is of 5.023 trillion rupiah. The grand total of the assets of 
the insurance system is 32.009 trillion rupiah. The role of the insurance company to the property 
value assessment is limited to the insurable part of the building, excluding the land. It is clear that 
the mortgage market is very important. Compared to two other pillars of the Indonesian financial 
system the total asset of the insurance system is still low. The comparison of the whole bank 
outstanding credit, capitalization of the capital market, and the insurance system does confirm the 
preponderance of the banking system. 
The commercial banking in Indonesia is surely the most vital one within the financial 
system, followed by the capital market. Due to their dominant role, the performances of the two 
systems could be considered as important indicators of the performance of the financial system. 
From the capital market, the Return on Equity (ROE) and the Return on Investment (ROI) are used 
as the success indicator of the capital employment, while the deposit rate is considered as an 
indicator of the healthiness of the banks system. The bank real interest rate should be comparable 
to other countries. This very important at the time of free flow of investments, because the funds 
for FDI are taken from foreign investors, usually with lower interest rates than the domestic rates. 
The difference in rates could put local firms in a disadvantage position, indicating the 
inappropriateness of the domestic interest rates. In evaluating the performance of the financial 
system, deposit rate should be compared to the two indicators, namely ROE and ROI. These 
indicators show how the economy performs. Through international comparative study, the ROI 
should be higher than the deposit rates, while the ROE is usually higher than the ROI. The deposit 
rates is usually closely linked to the national monetary or a macroeconomic policy, depending on 
the Central Bank.  
 
Listed Corporations Data Analysis 
 From the Indonesian Capital Market Directory since 1989, it is possible to get series of 
uninterrupted data for 131 listed companies’ performances in the Jakarta Stock Exchange or the 
JSX. Both the ROE and ROI are recorded since 1989 until 1998. But here the analysis is concen-
trated with the period between 1989 to 1996, the period before the crisis of 1997. In each year, the 
deposit rate in the banks is also recorded. Then the geometrical averages for the ROE, ROI and for 
the deposit rates are calculated. The results for the analysis are summarized in a table. 
Unfortunately the table of ROE and ROI for 131 corporations is quite long, so the complete list is 
not included in the present article. It could be made available on demand through internet. The 
table in the appendix, contains only 18 corporations, which are the best performing firms in the 
JSX, 1989-96.  
To our surprise, since long before the crisis, there are only 18 corporations13, where the level 
of ROE is higher than the deposit rates. By taking the ROI indicators, it is much worse. Simply 
using the opportunity cost principle it is better to put the fund in other activities or firms, which 
could be capable rendering higher returns. Instead of presenting the whole table, a short table on 18 
best performing corporations is presented in the appendix, table AP3. From the 18 best firms, 11 
are declared as FDI. It is disappointing, because most domestic firms are inferior to the FDI firms. 
A question is worth, what is the role of the difference between domestic and foreign interest rates 
in the performances of the FDI and local listed corporations? FDI uses foreign funds with lower 
rates, while local firms are with higher interest rates. Nonetheless the superiority of FDI is real.  
                                                           
13  The whole list of the 131 corporations was not reported here, but it is separately available, while the 17 best performing corporations 




Bank credit for 131 corporations, in Rp. trillion and in its equivalent, $ billion 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Rupiah T 2,88 3,55 5,46 7,78 12,54 14,98 21,37 27,56 71,70 90,37 
In US$ B 1,627 1,926 2,800 3,833 6,008 6,933 9,504 11,766 15,419* 11,261* 
Source:  Summarized and calculated. 
(Note: * = by using end of the year exchange rate, T = trillion, B = billion )  
 
But to our further surprise, those corporations were still able to get credit from the banks. 
How could a bank award credit to firms with ROE less than the deposit rates? How does it come? 
This is a riddle in the Indonesian economy that must be clarified, which partly contributed to the 
causes of the crisis. This should be put under the public control in the future, based on the right 
provisions of the institutions. The public at large should be involved because they will pay the bill 
of any bailout for any kind of financial failure14. It should be a part of the good governance criteria, 
the democratization of the supervision on the financial system. But due to the required financial 
knowledge is limited to a small number of experts, there is a need to see the information provision 
as an act of public good provision, as the above arguments show. The coming financial crisis could 
be avoided or at least minimized, if the public vigilance exert pressure to the government. As it is 
evident after the crisis, the most severely hit group is the lowest social strata. The avoidance of the 
financial crisis is a pro-poor strategy.  
By verifying Table 4, the level of credit for the 131 listed corporations in 1996 before the 
crisis broke up was equivalent to 11.766 billion US$ at the then exchange rates.  At that time the 
level of credit for the small-scale industries in Indonesia was 49.291 trillion rupiah. So the credit 
for 131 corporations was 56 percent for thousands of the small-scale industries. And the credit for 
131 corporations was on top of the funds they raised from the capital market. The riddle in the 
credit award for the less performing corporations, listed in the JSX, can be attributable to the fact 
that conglomerates own many banks and corporations. The many violations on LLL (legal lending 
limit) are valid indication of the following citation: <…, tycoons have favored raising capital from 
within the network, for instance from affiliated banks.15> Such practices should be abolished in the 
future, because it concerns not only economic efficiency reasons, but also social and political 
aspects. The abolition of the “relationship” banking practices will be touching the issue on the 
separation of baking business from other economic activities.  
                                                           
14  The interest of the bonds for bank recapitalization is charged to the government budget, starting from the fiscal year of 1999/2000. The society as 
a whole is footing the bill of the financial debacle. Poor us!  
15  “Asian Capitalism. The end of tycoons” in The Economist, April 29th, 2000, p.75 
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Creation of Appropriate Institutions  
 In the case of urban land, there are two contradictory sides. The high price of land for private 
or business uses has erected a barrier for many households to own a decent house for the family, 
but it is a source of windfall gains for the landowners or the developers. The last groups really take 
advantages of the external-economy due to the construction of the public goods and the rising 
scarcity of well-equipped land. From the other side, the owners of the expropriated land have been 
incurred a substantial amount of losses due to the insufficient sum of the compensation of their 
land. But the perceived loss is due to the prevailing price after the construction of the 
infrastructures, where the land price has been substantially raised, containing pure rents. This is a 
misperception because it is due to inappropriate incentive system in the economy. But the 
perceived disbenefited social groups in the population are not aware on the embodied pure rents in 
the price of their land. The perception becomes real because the institutions in place have been 
embodying that misperception. This is a distorted situation but no efforts were made to rectify it. It 
needs a change in the evaluation system so that the true values and prices become the reality in the 
property market. A change in these evaluations leading to true values of the assets needs a change 
in institutions and policies in place too, which should be the bases of the new and correct 
perception.  
In order to have a healthy economy, the Pareto optimality criteria should be the rule, 
especially if the situation resembles a zero sum game situation. But in general, the city economy is 
in a state of positive sum game. The problem is on the distribution of benefits and costs of the city 
development. So there should not be losers if the positive gains and costs were distributed rightly. 
The right distribution should be the watchword in the urban internal economic transformation. 
Within the scope of city economy, big infrastructure construction, is a real structural change to the 
regions (city + environment). The ring-road construction in Jakarta for example, entails a 
significant change to the city economy and also on the surrounding regions and economic 
environments. But inherently, due to the still inappropriate distribution of costs and benefits, it 
incurs losses for some group of the population, while other groups obtain windfall gains, which 
could be substantially high in monetary terms. This is not fair and unjust.  
 In order to satisfy the criterion of the Pareto optimality, it is here proposed the so-called 
symmetrical treatment of externalities. It is meant that anyone, who gains benefits should pay the 
bill of the infrastructure costs, while those who get negative impacts (due to the construction of the 
infrastructure) must be compensated adequately. The principle should be regarded as another 
expression of the no pure rent condition in the economy. The windfall gains in the urban land 
business should be regarded differently with the situation of gold discovery in California. A 
consistent use of the principle will lead to the right urban land price, resulting in the right price of 
houses in urban area with a rational proportion of land price. The land price is a source of many 
disputes in Indonesia, whether between the developers or the government with the landowners or 
between the developers with the government. From an unsystematic survey on newspaper 
publication between 1970 and 1996, 127 of 196 cases or 65 percent of land problems are due to the 
land price disputes16. So it is important to have the institutions dealing with systematic land value 
assessment, embodying both the justice principle and the economic efficiency reasons of the urban 
land prices, extendible to land price in general.  
 
Private Ordering On Land Values or Prices 
 By referring to the NIE, New Institutional Economics, it is proposed another way to dispute 
resolution in the society. Usually, many of these go through the judicial system. But for the case of 
                                                           
16  See Dj. A. Simarmata (1997), p. 392. 
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Indonesia this institution is still saddled with bad practices, leading to doubts on the efficiency of 
the judicial system. The NIE proposes the so-called private ordering17 system. By this, the 
members of society resolve disputes without recourse to the judicial system, based on mutual 
arrangement between them. Private ordering needs transparent system in place, a well-accepted 
evaluation method of the land values and prices. It should not be a perfect one, but embodying the 
principle of just and healthy economy. Such system could reduce the social tensions, and leads to 
less social cost for conflict resolution on land problems. Due to the growing urbanization and 
extension of urbanized areas, without a well-established and well-designed institution in place, 
more urban land conflicts will be looming. So the benefits of establishing right institutions on the 
land value and prices lead not only to economic efficiency, but also to better social efficiency, 
promoting social peace due to the rise on social trust.  
 
 Asset market, namely property and equity market are not fully satisfying the assumed EMH. 
They are subject to situation of unsymmetrical information, raising the issue of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Herd behavior and the bubble phenomena reign in the stock market, while the 
urban land market reside in an environment, rich on the externality and the bubble phenomena, too. 
Herd behavior is a sign of limited rationality on the part of market participants. Each participant is 
not as rational as the received ideas suppose. The simultaneous presence of unsymmetrical 
information and externality is an indication of the market imperfection, necessitating the provision 
of the right institutions.  
 A country has five elements of institutional endowments (North, 1981, 1990):  
1. Its legislative and executive institutions  
2. Its judicial institutions  
3. Its administrative capabilities  
4. Custom and other informal but broadly accepted norms  
5. The character of the contending social interests within a society and the balance between them, 
including the role of ideology.  
The definition of Khan et al on institution is simpler: formal rules, informal constraints, and 
their enforcement characteristics, which could be perceived as resulting from the five elements. 
Here the topic is concentrated on the impacts of the evaluation method to the market price of the 
assets, with an objective of the abolition of pure rents, so that the economy could be less inflicted 
by the bubble phenomena, every income is the result of productive works. On top of that, the case 
of negative impacts of the rising urban housing price on the poor should be an integral part of the 
policy. For the asset market as a whole it should be intended to prevent the occurrence of crisis, 
hence an instrument to maintain economic stability. The occurrence of capital market bubble 
should be avoided, not by the imposition of tax as in urban land market, but by the dissemination of 
the assessment evaluation methods and the required information. The dissemination of the 
methods and the information is intended to raise the awareness of the public on the true value of the 
equity market, leading the general participants to rational choice in the capital market with true 
prices. There should be a prescription of the necessary information for the evaluation of the equity 
securities. The government should conduct an inventory of the best-accepted methods from all 
over the world, and choose the best one for Indonesia, but subject to revision due to the possible 
improvement. It is sure that there will be critics on the proposed methodology, which might lead to 
a system of special method for each sector or sub-sector. But such a process will lead to wider 
participation from the members of the society at large for determining the best-accepted 
                                                           
17  Williamson, Oliver E. in : Proceedings of the World Bank, (1994) 
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methodology. It is again a kind of democratization, which is a good thing for the society, better 
governance.  
 
 Specifically for the assessment of property market, the wide availability of mortgage 
instruments will be complementary to the previous institution. Mortgage market will be 
functioning in a competitive way in assessing the value and then the price of the property market. 
Such a competitive environment will lead to a better evaluation. Hence the development of the 
mortgage market in Indonesia is important, not only for the reasons of the completeness of the 
security components in the capital market, but also as another additional institution on the urban 
land market price assessment.  
 From the other government side, the determination of the land value and price for the 
purpose of land taxes should be based on the true economic value, using the previous 
methodology. It should not be only as a means for collecting high property tax income, but also as 
an instrument for erecting the true value of the land. The present system is still based on the 
objective for collecting the highest possible revenue. The stated urban land price for land taxation 
purpose does not conform to the prevailing market price, an indication of bad governance practice.  
 Another important institution to be created is the provision of general information on the 
benefits of investment in every sector of the economy. This should be an informal advocacy for a 
general pattern of good investment allocations between sectors in the economy. The data from 
CBS should be sharpened in fulfilling this objective, namely from I-O table. Table AP1 presents 
credit for several big-sectors, as for agriculture, industry, trades and services. As it seen in the table, 
the sum of total outstanding credit for trades and services is much higher than the credit for 
industry and agriculture in 1996, before the crisis. Table AP2 shows the outstanding credit for the 
property sector in 1995, which is much higher for agriculture. By using enlightened common 
sense, anybody will find a short of injustice, a case of misallocation of credits. The industries and 
agriculture employ a higher number of people, wider spatial impacts in the country, which is much 
more rural oriented. The property sector is more urban oriented, spatially concentrated. In hind-
sight, it is clear that the property sectors have been oversupplied. The use of a broad indicator for 
the comparative advantage between sectors is presented in table AP5, which is derived from the 
1990 I-O table. The figures in the table show that the profitability of the construction industries and 
trade is higher than that in the industrial group of textile, clothes and leather products, the industrial 
group of machinery, electrical appliances, and electronics rubber and plastics wares. The relative 
advantage of the two industry groups, namely construction and trade was confirmed by the flow of 
credit to the property sector and trade in the table AP1. The case of woods and forestry products 
should be considered in conjunction to the monopoly position of the license holders, where the 
export of logs were forbidden, leading to the protection of the industry groups. But, the indicators 
failed to show the potential profitability in many agriculture activities, as the rice and many other 
food crops production, which fall under the family enterprising. It seems that the indicators are 
only valid for formal and corporate sectors. The CBS should make more efforts on this front, by 
adjusting the data concerned with the above objective, providing a general indicator of the sectoral 
profitability of investment. Of course, the potential profitability indicators derived from the data 




 Capital market and urban land market, or assets market, contain some imperfections due to 
several factors, amounting to inappropriate assets pricing, due to the asymmetries or in the incom-
plete information. There is asymmetry on the mastery of the methods of true value determination 
in urban land, a lack of knowledge on the subject in the public side. A simplified method should be 
made available to the public, a short of democratization on the urban land price assessment. There 
should be a dissemination of the phenomena, that urban land price is significantly determined by 
the provision of the public goods or public infrastructures, financed by taxes. A lot of other positive 
external effects due to the agglomeration have been at the source of the rising value of urban land, 
which is not due to the owners or holders of the land. As such, the landowners or landholders are 
not the legitimate beneficiaries of the whole capital gains on urban land. It contains pure economic 
rents, and if it becomes significant in the urban land price, the bubble phenomena take place, which 
is unstable and crisis-prone. A significant part of the pure rents should be expropriated for the 
society, for financing the infrastructures. It is more just, because if not, it is the public who pays the 
bill of the public goods or the public infrastructure construction costs. Such a system is expected to 
lead the urban land market to the lower true price. An economically justified urban land price will 
have another positive impact to the poor in the urban area, by enabling them to occupy and to own 
a decent house. If urban land price is allowed to contain substantial pure economic rents, 
speculation will be flourishing with its negative effects, the bubble phenomena, with its tendency 
to crisis when it bursts. Crisis hits the poor severely. Hence, to avoid the bubble phenomena will 
strengthen the crisis prevention, a pro-poor strategy. Through good institution provision, avoiding 
excessive pure economic rents in some sectors in the economy as a whole, it will contribute to 
more balanced investment allocations, which will lead the economy to higher quality of growth 
achievement. The case of urban land overpricing is mostly important for the developing countries 
like Indonesia, because the urbanization growth is comparatively higher in these countries 
compared to the industrialized countries. This is due to the present stage, where the level of 
urbanization is still low in comparison to the normal level in the developed countries.  
 As it was seen in the discussions, the unjustified urban land prices will be mostly against the 
urban poor, especially for access to a decent housing. The incorrectly widely held attitude on the 
urban land investment, which is really a speculation, could be a vehicle on becoming quickly rich 
for a small number of people, disposing a large sum of money, but impoverishing the already poor 
people in the urban areas. The very fast development of the slum areas in the big cities is an indica-
tion of the these processes.  
 The same thing should be applied to the capital market, providing appropriate systems or 
institutions to avoid the bubble phenomena, which is committed by overpricing the equity stocks 
or other securities in the capital market. As in the property market, bubble phenomena will lead to 
instability in the economy, a crisis. In turn, it is the poor who will be severely hit. The right 
institutions for the formation of securities true price should complement the capital market. The 
institutions should be aiming to minimize the herd behavior phenomena, triggering a crisis. One 
condition to that is the availability of all required information, transparency on all data and 
information to the investors. And, the availability of widely and proven accepted methods of equity 
value assessment, could be contributing to the irrationality of the market participants in the form of 
herd behavior. A set of corporate performance indicators, namely the ROE and ROI, should be 
referred to the deposit rates or lending rates in the banks, with an appropriate adjustment to the 
attending risks in the respective stocks or securities. If the ROI for a sufficiently long period for the 
equity securities is lower than the lending rates or deposit rates, it should be regarded as a sign of 
the inappropriateness of the investment. Either the investors should not buy the stocks or the banks 
should not accord credit for the firms concerned. The public should be empowered by publicly 
providing the accepted methods of value assessment and the wide availability of the required 
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information, the transparency criteria on the part of the corporations. All corporations in the capital 
market have to satisfy the good governance prerequisites.  
 Hence there should be a special effort from the government for making the urban land and 
property market healthy, as well as the financial market in general. The government should not 
follow the Walras advice for land nationalization, but just the nationalization of economic rents, 
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Outstanding Credit (RP billion) 
and Its Growth Rates in Several Big Sectors 
 Tradable Goods Non-tradable Goods 
Agriculture Industry Trades Services 
Credit in 
Rp Billion Growth, % 
Credit in 
Rp Billion Growth, % 
Credit in 
Rp Billion Growth, % 
Credit in 
Rp Billion Growth, % 
1993 12057  51432  37794  35824  
1994 13860 14,9 60211 17,0 44372 17,4 50809 41,8 
1995 15525 12,0 72088 19,7 54224 22,2 66584 30,9 
1996 17630 13,5 78850 9,3 70586 30,2 91655 37,6 
1997 26002 47,5 111679 41,6 82264 16,5 113569 23,9 
1998 39308 51,2 171668 53,7 96364 17,1 139124 22,5 
Source: Adapted from: Statistics of Economy and Finance of Indonesia, Bank Indonesia, October 1999. 
Table AP2 
Outstanding Credit and its Growth for Property, 1992-1996 
(in billion Rupiah) 
Year Outstanding Credit Growth 
1992 16.374 - 
1993 21.900 33,5 
1994 33.400 52,5 
1995 48.600 45,5 
1996 53.800 10,7 
Source: Bank Indonesia, cited in Business News 6040/30-7-1997. 
Table AP3 
Development of ROE for 17 nonbank corporations, 
having ROE > average deposit rates, within the period of 1989-1996 
Corporation 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 AV 89-96 
Deposit Rate 18,63 17,3 23,32 19,6 14,55 12,53 16,72 17,26 20,01    > 20 17,23 
Charoen Pokphand Indonesia* 6,43 22,64 18,9 21,72 27,98 25,98 23,09 18,21 -27,66 -18,6 19,17 
Petrosea * 54,52 19,27 19,2 22,44 24,42 22,44 7,66 9,58 37,32 42,42 19,16 
Delta Djakarta * 23,95 36,49 43,25 29,36 33,75 34,17 34,46 21,54 -10,94 14,82 31,42 
Multi Bintang Indonesia * 22,1 28,84 31,21 29,25 40,33 40,3 41,47 35,61 23,62 10,16 32,97 
Sari Husada  17,43 18,41 20,16 19,22 24,43 23,43 27,98 33,00 26,94 4,67 22,51 
BAT Indonesia * 10,98 20,36 11,55 12,75 19,02 31,92 51,77 56,2 23,41 18,02 22,16 
Indo-Rama Synthetics * 33,2 16,08 17,85 24,51 19,92 19,94 21,12 18,25 12,91 0,09 20,85 
Polysindo Eka Perkasa  76,89 26,41 23,26 28,29 16,95 15,93 24,16 11,12 1,27 -193,99 23,62 
Unggul Indah Corporation * 24,79 30,35 27,94 20,44 16,6 13,38 13,05 15,25 1,91 13,87 19,27 
Ekadharma Tape Industries  33,22 22,09 18,97 21,22 17,35 21,22 21,22 21,22 10,48 33,14 21,69 
Good Year Indonesia * 15,74 28,24 26,97 27,79 25,05 27,79 27,79 27,79 4,12 28,76 25,51 
Modern Photo Film Company  14,23 19,52 26,69 17,21 19,26 21,39 21,63 20,48 -9,54 -29,72 19,76 
Dankos Laboratories 15,97 5,71 15,26 24,91 32,24 22,6 20,47 20,14 0,93 -159,94 17,87 
Merck Indonesia * 24,25 33,38 42,89 57,22 64,26 74,12 79,28 72,1 63,81 32,2 52,08 
Schering Plough Indonesia * 52,32 31,56 18,22 30,14 32,57 37,19 36,59 22,27 25,38 -4,54 31,19 
Unilever Indonesia * 39,05 47,26 51,39 58,82 57,65 55,72 53,27 42,39 43,86 40,16 50,22 
Sorini Corporation  37,82 35,09 22,14 20,77 24,18 22,42 13,62 9,53 -270,5 n.a 21,34 





A developer house types and land cost portion in the house price 
House type 
Area [m2 ] Cost [thousand Rp]  
Total house price Land cost portion, % 
Land Floor Land Structure 
Lawu I 162 62 85 860 38 440 127 030 67.59 
Lawu II 162 68 85 860 42 160 131 265 65.41 
Lawu III 162 90 85 860 55 800 146 820 58.48 
Arjuna I 216 78 114 480 48 360 166 070 68.93 
Arjuna II 216 81 114 480 50 220 168 190 68.07 
Arjuna IV 216 88 114 480 54 560 173 135 66.12 
Arjuna V 216 103 114 480 63 860 183 740 62.31 
Semeru I 315 112 176 400 73 920 255 205 69.12 
Semeru II 315 120 178 400 79 200 261 220 67.53 
Semeru III 315 124 178 400 81 840 264 235 66.76 
Semeru IV 315 123 178 400 81 180 263 480 66.95 
Semeru V 315 167 178 400 110 220 296 590 59.48 
Merapi I 345 198 203 550 139 590 356 380 57.12 
Merapi II 345 221 203 550 155 805 374 865 54.30 
Kelud I 450 198 265 500 139 590 416 405 63.76 
Kelud II 450 210 265 500 148 050 426 050 62.32 
Kelud III 450 221 265 500 155 805 434 890 61.05 




Some Indonesian Economic Incentives Index represented  
by Net Operating Profits in the Value Added (1990 I-O table) 
Product/ Sector Percentage of Net Operating Profits in Value Added (1-7), in I-O 
1. Woods and other Forestry Products 77,93 
2. Textile, clothes and leather products 43,52 
3. Machinery, electrical appl. and Electronics 41,52 
4. Rubber and plastics wares 44,94 
5. Trading (non-tradable) 69,50 
6. Hotel & Restaurants (non-tradable) 61,20 
7. Construction and property (non-tradable) 75,43 
Source: Calculated from I-O 1990 table, CBS, by Simarmata 
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Table AP6a. 
German Land-Price Growth Index, between 1950-197018 
 1950 1960 1965 1970 Grwth, % 
Land Price 100 310 939 1201 13.23408 
Housing Rent 100 132 175 242 4.517922 
Housing Const. Costs 100 157 209 269 5.072149 




JAPAN between 1955-1990, AssetPrice Ratio and its Growth, %19 
 Ratio Growth 
Resident Land Price Ratio, 6cities 200 16.34393 
Stock Price Ratio 90 13.71965 
CPI Ratio 8 6.121302 
 
                                                           
18  See Simarmata, Dj. A. (1997), op cit, Table 2.2, p. 73 
19  Nishimura, Kiyohiko G., et.al. : “Distortionary Taxation, Excessive Price Sensitivity, and Japanese Land Prices,” NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138, 
July 1997, rearranged into tabular form by the author, from p. 1 
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Complementary Note 1. 
 
A Note on Concerns and Quotations over Asset Price: 
 Table AP6 shows the growth rate of land price in Germany between 1950-1970, and in Japan between 
1955-1990. The table on Japan contains also the growth rates of asset price. It is seen that in land price growth rate is 
higher in Japan than in Germany, but it is higher in the 6 locations in Jakarta (even though with a shorter time period, 
between 1983-1996, see table 3).  
 With with a similar concern but a wider scope, we can see the following citation from Alan Greenspan and 
Charles Goodhart on the necessity of a new insight on the assets price inflation20: 
 
< Mr. Greenspan told the gathering of central bankers that the prices of shares and property are playing an increasing 
role in driving the economies; and thus that central bankers need to pay more attention to asset prices. … …  
… Charles Goodhart, a member of the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee, presented a controversial paper 
on asset prices at a Eurostat conference this week. He argued that central bankers have focussed on too narrow a 
measure of inflation and that the prices of houses and financial assets should be included in a broader inflation index.> 
The Economist, September 4th 1999, p. 82. 
 
 
                                                           
20  The author of this article has expressed a similar concern in his book, see: Simarmata, Dj. A., (1997), p. 9 
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Complementary Note 2: 
 
A Note on Walras’ Land Value: 
Thorugh his elaboration, Walras found the price of a land A, with yearly rental value of a, with an yearly increment in 
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If z>i, the formula can restated in the following form, and if m → ∝, the value of A, or the price of land can be very 

































which again give the very big value of A if m → ∝. 
Based on the result of his mathematical elaboration, Walras proposed to isolate the land market from the free market, 
through nationalization of land.  
 
By using the incentive theory arguments, I refuse to nationalize the land, but instead, nationalize the rents of the 
land. This is more amenable to the market system in the economy, through embodiment of the economic incentive 
systems. One of the proposals from the economic incentive theory is to reduce the pure economic rents to zero, which is 
among others found in the urban land market.  
 
A Note on the impacts of land value in capital, using CGE 
 The author used the CGE model for analyzing the impacts of the rise of land value in the economic growth 
potential. The result of the analysis shows an irregular growth pattern, because at some land value proportions in the 
capital, the growth potential is unlimitedly high. The simulation was repeated by using many (hundred) land value 
proportions, with analog results in the irregularity pattern. This leads the author to the guess, that the impacts of land 
value in CGE model could give rise to the chaotic value results. Chaotic results could come out of even a very simple 
model, as presented in the work of Abraham-Frois et Berrebi [1995].  
 
 
